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Abstract
Economic structure, households energy consumption pattern, and household's
pattern of factor income in developing countries may typically be dierent with
those of the developed countries, hence the distributional impact of energy price
reforms could be. This may be portrayed using a Computable General Equilibrium
(CGE) model with disaggregated households that allows for rich and accurate dis-
tributional story. Using this method, counter-factual scenarios analysis of recent
energy price reform in Indonesia is carried out. The result suggests that vehicle fu-
els subsidy is regressive but increasing the price of domestic fuel (such as kerosene)
tends to increase inequality, unless accompanied by a proper and eective com-
pensation scheme. Distributional impact does depend on compensation scheme, its
form and its eectiveness. Cash transfers to the poor with moderate ineectiveness,
for example, could not even prevent the increase in poverty nation-wide. Giving
more cash to urban poor than to rural poor might have been better than a simple
uniform cash transfers, due to urban poor's dependence on kerosene. The result
also suggests that non-cash compensation, by subsidizing the poor's education and
health spending may not be eective to mitigate the reform despite its desirability
as longer-term poverty alleviation programs.
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1 Introduction
Global fuel subsidy could amount to between 250 and 300 billion dollar a year, which
could "comfortably" pay o sub-Saharan Africa's entire international debt burden, leav-
ing billions of dollars to spare (NEF 2004). Fuel subsidy creates distortion in the econ-
omy by disregarding the economic value of the fuel, creating excess consumption, and
preventing energy substitution in the long-run. Since, Indonesia started to become a
net oil importer since 2004, energy switch is very crucial in the future direction of the
country's energy mix. Fuel subsidy has been a constraint to this important agenda.
Fossil fuel subsidy is also regarded as the main cause of environmental problems,
not only pollution created by fossil fuel combustion by industry and vehicles, but also
excessive trac and the inconvenience it caused, as well as discourage the development
of more trac-free public transport infrastructure. In most big cities in Indonesia, this
has already been a major public concern.
In addition to the above eciency-related problem, fuel subsidy is also regarded
as inequitable (although not necessary so). Vehicle owners benet greatly from fuel
subsidy, and fuel price reform had been widely advocated as the means of promoting
eciency but also equity.
The biggest concern, among all of those, however, is the scal burden of the subsidy.
Fuel subsidy has been the main part of the central government budget. In the year
2000 for example (see table 1), fuel subsidy was amount to 40.9 trillion rupiahs, which
was almost a third of the total government spending. Since government always has
political constraint with regard to reducing this subsidy, government spending then
heavily constrained by the uctuation of the world oil price, especially after the year
2004 when Indonesia become net oil importer.
When world oil price started to rise rapidly since 2004, the government saw no option
but to radically reform its fuel price policy. In October 2005 the government made a
big adjustment in the fuel prices following rapid rise of the world crude oil price. At the
end, it is not eciency argument, or the voices from energy-price reformist, that urged
the government to implement the reform, but international market.
For the last few years, actually, the reduction of fuel subsidy had been one of the main
agenda of Indonesian government. Indonesian government had made gradual reform in
its fuel policy as well as adjustment in the fuel prices since the year 1999 (see Box 1 and
gure 1).
However, what made the reform went slowly was mainly strong opposition from the
people and the parliament. Most of the opposition come from the concern that increase
in fuel prices will translate into higher of other prices, reduce purchasing power, and
exacerbate poverty. The oppositions of fuel price reform had been concerned that the
fuel price rise would create big chain reaction to other prices such as transportation and
other important commodity, and nally will hurt the economy, and eventually will aect
the least vulnerable such as the poor. Among many economists, however, the voices was
almost unanimous that fuel price reform will not only be ecient but also equitable.
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Table 1: Fuel Subsidy, Government Budget, and Oil Price, 1999 - 2006
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Fuel Subsidy (Rp Trillion) 40.9 53.8 68.4 31.2 30.0 59.2 89.2 62.7
Government Spending (Rp Trillion) 201.9 188.4 260.5 322.2 376.5 430.0 411.6 470.2
Percent 20.26 28.56 26.25 9.68 7.97 13.77 21.67 13.34
World crude oil price ($/barrel) 17.12 27.07 22.72 23.47 27.1 34.62 49.86 60.32
Source: Ministry of Finance, and U.S. IEA
Box 1. Timeline of Indonesian Fuel Pricing Policy
1 January 1999
Before 1999, all fuel prices were heavily subsidised. Since January 1999, GOI started to let aviation fuel
price free according to market mechanism. At that time the price of Avtur was Rp. 1,700 and the price
of Avgas was Rp. 1,080.
1 April 2001
Fuel prices was set according to three categories. (a) Fuels consumed by general public were still
subsidised; (b) Fuels for industry was set to be 50% of the market price (mean of Platts Singapore of the
previous month plus 5 percent), and would be increased gradually; (3) Fuels for international business
activities was 100% of market price.
16 June 2001
Another adjustment in the administered fuel prices with a statement that fuel prices for industry could
be increased or decreased depending on the international prices.
6 January 2002
Gasoline price was adjusted to follow fully (100%) international price, kerosene price for general public
was increased to Rp. 600. Other fuels (for industry) price were set to be 75% of the market prices. GOI
also set price ceiling system (maximum and minimum retail price) depending on the international crude
oil prices
1 March 2002
GOI delegated monthly retail prices to PERTAMINA (state-owned oil company) to be able to uctuate
according to average market prices. Fuel prices (except kerosene) started to uctuate relatively more
often during 2002 (see gure 1). Adjustment to fuel prices was made in April, May, June, July, August,
September, October, November, and December 2002.
1 January 2003
Price of Kerosene was increased from Rp. 600 to Rp. 700. With usual adjustment in other fuel prices.
Adjustment in the price of fuels (except kerosene) was made almost every month since then. GOI
increased diesel price by 21.9% but then reduced it 6.5% due to public protest. Figure 1 shows a rare
case where diesel price drop in February 2003.
1 October 2005
GOI release Presidential Decree (Perpres) no. 55/2005 declaring huge increase in the price of gasoline
from Rp. 2400 to 4500 (87.5%), diesel from Rp. 2100 to Rp. 4300 (104.7%) and kerosene from Rp. 700
to Rp 2000 (185.7%).
By the time was perfect due to what happened in the world crude oil price market
in the mid 2000's, the government made a big adjustment in the subsidised fuel prices.
The reform package was announced in 1 October, 2005 consisting of increasing retail fuel
prices for gasoline, kerosene, and diesel. The price of gasoline was increased by 87.5%,
diesel by 104.7%, and surprisingly kerosene by 185.7%. The huge increase in kerosene
price start to doubt many economists about the distributional direction of this reform1
despite its compensation scheme.
In this case study, the CGE model will be used to simulate the economy-wide and
distributional impact of the October 2005 package. Moreover, the experiment will be
1Among others are Azis (2006), Oktaviani et al. (2005), and many others comentators in media.
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Figure 1: Price of gasoline, diesel, and kerosene, 1999 - 2006
able to answer in greater detail whether or not and by how much poverty will be aected,
is the reform progressive ore regressive, as well as what kind of compensation that may
be the most eective.
This simulation not only provide an estimate of the poverty and inequality impact of
this reform, but also provide lessons learned, and alternative better scenarios that might
have been possible, for further reform in the future. Even after the last "shocking" fuel
price increase in October 2005, currently the price of gasoline still 70% of the market
price, and the price of kerosene is even still 31% of the market price. The government
plans to totally remove this subsidy in the next one or two years. Hence, this is still a
big issue that will remain in the near future, especially because kerosene is consumed
more proportionally by the urban poor.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section discussed briey the previ-
ous studies that analyse the impact of reducing fuel subsidy in Indonesia, followed by
discussion on methodology in the next section. On the methodology, rst the Social
Accounting Matrix used as the data for the analysis is discussed, and after that the
structure of the CGE model will be discussed in greater detail, such as the production
structure, household's demand, as well as the method on analyzing distributional im-
pact, the important feature of the model, will be discussed. Later on scenarios, and
discussion on the simulation results will be discussed before the nal section concludes.
2 Previous studies
World Bank (2006) is the only available study that asses the distributional impact of
October 2005 Package. However, other studies that analyse the impact of fuel subsidy
reduction or fuel price rice for Indonesia do exist, although are not explicitly on this
specic reform. They are Clements et al. (2003), Sugema et al. (2005), and Ikhsan
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et al. (2005), which were published before October 2005 package was implemented.
The method used by World Bank (2006) is a simulation using SUSENAS 2004 house-
hold survey data, from the increase in various fuel prices on household expenditure,
assuming no mitigating substitution eects. The total impact is disaggregated into the
impacts on household expenditure of fuel prices; public transport prices (assuming 25
percent pass-through of the diesel price); and the general impact of residual ination
on the rest of the consumption bundle. The overall incremental ination (due to the
fuel price increase) assumption is based on time-series analysis of the overall elasticity
of ination to fuel price increases (0.06 percent for 10 percent increase in fuel prices).
The residual (non-fuel; non-transport) incremental ination rate is computed at about
1.9 percent for the October fuel price increases.
The result suggests that in the absence of any compensatory measures, it is estimated
that the October 2005 package would have led to a 5.6 percentage point increase in the
poverty incidence. Compensation in the form of unconditional cash transfer to poor and
near-poor households, more than oset, on average, the negative impact of the fuel price
increase for the poor. Hence, the impact of the combined eects of the fuel price increase
and the compensation point to a net positive income gain, overall, for the poorest 20
percent of the population. Even with greater mistargeting of random cash benet to
bottom 60% still lead to positive net impact on the bottom 40%.2
It is not clear, however, how household behaviour in this study3 is modelled. Al-
though the mechanism from fuel prices to ination seems to be based on historical data,
other price transmission, such as transport price from diesel price seems to be ad-hoc.
This simulation do not take into account economy-wide eect of the fuel price rises on
the supply side, and their likely impact on households factor income through factor
market. In this simulation, in seems that household income is assumed to be xed, only
changed by cash compensation.
With regards to distributional story, World Bank (2006) does not distinguish urban
and rural households, it only distinguishes household by deciles. Urban and rural dis-
tinction may be important since urban poor is the biggest consumers of kerosene (not
rural poor), hence poverty impact can not be separated. From SUSENAS 2002, it is
calculated that 82.74% of the poorest 20% population are rural, under-represent what
could happen to urban poverty.
Ikhsan et al. (2005) analyses the distributional impact of March 2005 fuel price
adjustment. The fuel price adjustment are increase in the price of kerosene to industry
by 22.22%, gasoline by 32.60%, diesel for transportation by 27.27%, diesel for industry
by 33.33, diesel oil and fuel oil by 39.39%. In this price adjustment kerosene for domestic
household use was not increased.
The method used by Ikhsan et al. (2005) is a combination of CGE model (INDO-
CEEM4) and household survey data simulation. Hence, it is more or less similar to
World Bank (2006) but the price or ination numbers are taken out from CGE model
simulation. In the literature this approach is in the class of top-down micro-simulation,
where CGE model and distribution part are separate entity, starting from simulation in
CGE and transfered the price result to micro-simulation data. The household survey
data used was SUSENAS 2002 consumption module.
The policies examined are March 2005 fuel price rise with various compensation
2From Figure 6.1 of World Bank (2006)
3Since the description of the methodology is not explained in detail, only briey at the footnote.
4INDOCEEM model is Indonesian CGE model based on ORANI-G developed initially by Monash
University and Ministry of Energy.
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schemes i.e, subsidy to rice and education spending of poor (targeted) households which
is the bottom 20%, with various assumption of eectiveness. The fuel price rises was
simulated in INDOCEEM model and produce increase in all commodities prices with
CPI increase by 0.9718%. The price rises then transferred to the SUSENAS simula-
tion. The results suggests that without compensation poverty rises by 0.24%, whereas
with compensation poverty falls by 2.6% if the compensation is 100% eective 100%,
and poverty fall by 1.89 if compensaton is only 75% eective (table 9 in Ikhsan et al.
(2005)).The policies simulated reduce inequality slightly.
The advantage of Ikhsan et al. (2005) is the use of INDOCEEM model where
dierent various fuel commodity is distinguished hence the model allows for dierent
shocks to dierent type of fuels5. However, in INDOCEEM model, there is only one
single representative households, hence to see distributional impact it has to rely on other
method and this is actually one of the methodological caveat of the approach. First, the
use of CGE model only to predict nominal price changes is always questionable, since
in nature CGE model is a real variable model. CGE model can not solve absolute price
level, and there always have to be one price that hold xed, where all price are relative
to that numeraire. Changing numeraire will not change the real solution. Usually in the
class of ORANI-G model like INDOCEEM, when CPI is made endogenous, exchange
rate is the numeraire, hence all nominal price change are relative to exchange rate. It
often the case, that in the CGE model, the magnitude of the price incrase is sensitive
to changing numeraire. Many CGE modelers avoid direct interpretation of nominal
variables results.
Secondly, when the price change is tranferred to the SUSENAS-based micro-simulation
model, the price change become exogenous, whereas in reality the structure of demand
of various households determine new equilibrium prices. This price changes is only deter-
mined in single household CGE model in this top-down approach. Thirdly, there is no
connection between factor market (which is actually represented in the CGE model) with
the micro-simulation, hence households factor income is not aected by the simulation,
because there is no direct link between supply side and household income.
In Clements et al. (2003), the CGE model used Social Accounting Matrix with
multi households, hence households heterogeneity is integrated6 directly into the CGE
model. In the simulation, the scenario is increasing the price of petroleum product by
25%. This model however has only one type of aggregated fuel commodity, where for
distributional story to be relevant, at least kerosene is better to be distinguished. The
households however has only 10 categories, and grouped by socio-economic class, not by
income size, hence direct progressivity or regressivity as well as poverty incidence is not
easy to be assessed.
Clements et al. (2003) study suggests that real household consumption fall from
2.1% to 2.7%, where urban and high income suer the most indicating the progressivity
of fuel subsidy removal. It should be noted however that high income category indicated
in SAM is not necessarily the highest income size, but based on socio-economic char-
acteristics which mainly household type of occupation. Clements et al. (2003) argues
that high income groups suer more because they are endowed with relatively more
capital and sectors where production declines most signicantly are capital intensive.
Higher-income groups also consume more petroleum products and utilities. The study
5Not many CGE models can do this because even with 175 sectors I-O table petroleum product sector
is not disaggregated. INDOCEEM used specically designed I-O table built with the help of Indonesian
Statistics oce (BPS).
6As opposed to top-down approach as in Ikhsan et al. (2005)
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also report increase in poverty but by assuming certain value of elasticity of poverty to
mean consumption.
Another study is conducted by Sugema et al. (2005) where they analyse the impact
of March 2005 fuel price rises. In this study, the poverty impact analysis is carried
out using SUSENAS based simulation, and more macro-impact is carried out using
ORANI-based CGE model. Both method is conducted separately or not related.
In the CGE approach, the model use 10 SAM households categories, where 29% in-
crease in petroleum price is simulated. Since there is only one single petroleum product
in this model, it is not really represent the March 2005 price adjustment that is tried to
be simulated because kerosene did not rise in the March package therefore the impact
on households will be over-estimated. The result suggests that petroleum product con-
sumption by households fall from 17.51% to 22.86%. Again, however, it should be noted,
that especially in urban area household fuel consumption is mainly kerosene, where its
price is not changing, hence this results is a very rough if not inaccurate aproximation.
The impact on welfare (measured by utility) fall from -0.09% to 1.48%, and not much
dierent whether compensated or not. Aggregate household real consumption fall by
-.99 (without compensation), and by -0.91 (with compensation).
Distributional story in Sugema et al. (2005) is analysed using SUSENAS 2004 data.
March 2005 fuel price is assumed to lead to ination of 12.5%. Assumption on eective-
ness of compensation is based on previous compensation scheme. With the assumption
that fuel price rise of March 2005 will lead to ination of 12.5%,poverty line will rise
(with the assumption that elasticity is 1.3). As a result, poverty will rise by 1.95%. With
petroleum price rice of only 29% this poverty impact is considered very big. This may
be mainly due to the assumed high elasticity of ination with respect to fuel price rise
which is 0.43, as well as the elasticity of ination with respect to poverty line (1.3). For
comparison World Bank (2006), only assume that 0.06 percent ination for 10 percent
increase in fuel prices, which is based on historical data. Again this many assumption
made are among the caveats of these studies.
3 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM)
The distributional impact of policies analyzed in the CGE modelling framework have
been constrained in part by the absence of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) with dis-
aggregated households. Since Indonesian ocial SAM does not distinguish households
by income or expenditure size, it has prevented accurate assesment for the distribu-
tional impact, such as calculation of inequality or poverty incidence. The SAM used
in this paper, is a specially-constructed SAM representing Indonesian economy for the
year 2003, with 181 industries, 181 commodities, and 200 households (100 urban and
100 rural households grouped by expenditure per capita centiles) was constructed. The
SAM (with the size of 768x768 accounts) constitutes the the most disaggregated SAM
for Indonesia at both the sectoral and household level.
The construction of the SAM is among a lengthty process and consumed a lot of
research resources, such as eldwork and data collection, hence it will not covered in
this paper. The nature of constructing specically-designed SAM with distributional
emphasis not only require large-scale household survey data but also involved reconcili-
ation of various dierent data sources. Interested readers can refer to Yusuf (2006). The
structure of the SAM can be seen from table 2.
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Table 2 is the structure of the Social Accounting Matrix to be constructed. It has 768
rows and 768 columns in all. It distinguishes industries from commodities to allow for
industries producing multiple commodities, or the same commodity produced by several
industries. 181 sectoral classications are distinguished, and 200 households (100 urban
and 100 rural classied by centile of expenditure per capita) are classied by centile of
expenditure per capita.
The data sources used in this SAM construction are (1) Ocial BPS SAM 2003
(102102 accounts); (2) 181 sectors Input-Output table 2003; (3) SUSENAS Core Mod-
ule 2003, with 894,427 individual observations; (4) SUSENAS Core Module 2002, with
862,210 individual observations; (5) SUSENAS Consumption Module 2002, with 64,441
household observations; and (6) SUSENAS Income Module 2002, with 64,441 households
observations.
4 CGE Model
The CGE model is built based on ORANI-G model, an applied general equilibrium
(AGE) model of the Australian economy. Its theoretical structure is typical of a static
AGE model which consists of equations describing (1) producers' demands for produced
inputs and primary factors; (2) producers' supplies of commodities; (3) demands for
inputs to capital formation; (4) household's demand system; (5) export demands; (6)
government demands; (7) the relationship of basic values to production costs and to
purchasers' prices; (8) market-clearing conditions for commodities and primary factors;
and (9) numerous macroeconomic variables and price indices (Horridge 2000).
Demand and supply equations for private-sector agents are derived from the solu-
tions to the optimisation problems (cost minimisation, utility maximisation, etc.) which
are assumed to underlie the behaviour of the agents in conventional neoclassical microe-
conomics. The agents are assumed to be price-takers, with producers operating in
competitive markets with zero prot conditions.
To the standard ORANI-G model, the following modications in the model struc-
ture7 are carried out.
1. ORANI-G model treats energy commodity as among intermediate inputs under
Leontief production function. Therefore, it does not allow price-induced energy
substitution. The rst modication is to allow substitution among energy com-
modities, and also between primary factors (capital, labor, and land) and energy.
This modication is more or less similar to the modication in the INDOCEEM8
model, another ORANI-G based model built by Monash University and Indonesian
Ministry of Energy.
2. ORANI-G has only single household. Adding multi-household feature, then, is
another important modication to the model. The multi-household feature is not
only added to the expenditure or demand side of the model9, but also from the
income side of the households10.
7To be distinguished from modication to the model's database.
8which stands for Indonesian Comprehensive Economy and Energy Model.
9Such as done for some of other ORANI-G version.
10More or less similar modication to ORANI-G model has been made to the very popular WAYANG
model, an ORANI-G based Indonesian CGE model.
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3. ORANI-G model is almost purely based on Input-Output table, whereas for this
research many information require information from Social Accounting Matrix. In
a SAM, for example, corporate sector or enterprises own a great deal of undis-
tributed earning, and the value of transfers among institution such as from gov-
ernment to households are recorded. Those important feature which is crucial
for this model can not be captured form simply I-O based model. The model is
then modied to incorporate transfers inter-institutions, most importantly from
government to households.
4.1 Production Sectors
The structure of the nested production function for each industry is illustrated in gure
2. At the very bottom part of the gure, industry choose how many each type of
labor demanded and determine the number of labor composite according to Constant
Elasticity of Substitution aggregation function. Or more formally, every industry solve
the following optimisation problem,
min
X
o
woLo s.t. ~L = CES (L1; L2; : : : ; LO)
where wo is wage of each of the occupational type, Lo is the number of labor for each
occupation type, and ~L is labor composite, and o = 1; : : : ; O: List of skill-type of labor
can be seen in table 8 at the Appendix. In this model, the classiciation of the labor
type is fairly detail and also represent the higher degree of dualistic nature of informality
in the labor market, typical in developing countries. This typical informality is often
neglected in many others CGE model.
At the next stage, the optimisation problem for each of the industry is,
minPKK + PNN + ~w~L s.t. V = CES

K;N; ~L

where K and PK are capital and price of capital respectively, N and PN are land and
price of land respectively, and ~L and ~w are labor composite and its price respectively,
whereas V is value added or primary factor composite.
At the other end, for every energy commodity, each industry optimise to choose the
source of the commodity from either local or imported commodity, or
minPDe E
D
e + P
M
e E
M
e s.t. ~Ee = CES
 
EDe ; E
M
e

where PDe and E
D
e are price of domestic energy e and quantity of domestic energy e
respectively, where PMe and E
M
e are price of imported energy e and quantity of imported
energy e respectively, whereas ~Ee is domestic-imported composite of energy e.
The industry, then, choose the composition of energy type for every energy composite
that they need,
min
X
e
~Pe ~Ee s.t. E
C = CES

~E1; ~E2; : : : ; ~EE

where ~Pe and ~Xe are price and quantity of domestic-imported composite energy e,
respectively, while EC is the energy composite.
Industries are allowed to substitute between energy and primary factors, so they are
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Figure 2: Structure of Production
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solving the following optimization problem
minPEEC + P V V s.t. V E = CES
 
V;EC

where PE is the price of energy composite, and P V is the price of primary factor
composite, while V E is value-added and energy composite.
At the top of the production nest, each industry minimize cost of purchasing inter-
mediate costs and primary-factor-energy composite to produce output of the activity
level using Leontief production function, or
min
X
c
PcXc + P
V EV E s.t. A = min (X1; X2; : : : ; XC ; V E) :
where Pc and Xc are price and quantity of intermediate commodity c respectively, where
A is activity level or total output of industry.
In this model, each industry is allowed to produce multiple commodities11, such that
max
X
c
PcXc s.t. A = CET (X1; X2; : : : ; XC)
where CET refer to Constant Elasticity of Transformation function. And nally, in-
dustry can choose to sell either in local or export market such that the optimisation
problem is
max
X
PDc X
D
c + P
E
c X
D
c s.t. Xc = CET
 
XDc ; X
E
c

where PDc and X
D
c are price and quantity of commodity sold to local/domestic market,
whereas where PEc and X
E
c are price and quantity of commodity supplied to export
market.
The model has 38 number of sectors and 43 number of commodities. All indus-
try producing single commodity except petroleum renery sector where it produces 6
type of commodities i.e., gasoline, kerosene, automotive diesel oil, industrial diesel oil,
other fuels, and LPG. This is the aggregation from 181 sectors/commodities from the
Social Accounting Matrix, as discussed in the earlier section. Since fuel commodities
is disaggregated in detail, it can capture acurately how the October 2005 package was
implemented, because the rise in the fuel prices are diferents across fuel commodities.
4.2 Households
Household optimisation problem is illustrated in gure 3, where each household maxi-
mize Stone-Geary Utility function (in log form),
U =
X
i
i log (xi   i)
where xi is consumption of good i; i is subsistence consumption of good i; xi > i ,
0  i  1, and
P
i i = 1,
subject to
y =
X
i
pixi:
11Although in the model, it will only applies to a single renery industry that allow to produce multiple
type of fuels.
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This will yield the following demand system in expenditure form, which is called Linear
Expenditure System (LES).
pixi = pii + i
0@y  X
j
pjj
1A
Compared to Cobb-Douglas and CES demand system, LES is richer for distribu-
tional eect analysis, because income elasticity is not constant, hence the impact on the
same percentage shock on each household income, would generate dierent behavioral
responses by each households. The natural reason that income elasticity of households
are dierent is that marginal utility of income vary with level of income. Poor house-
holds will have higher marginal utility of income, while rich household will have lower.
In the LES, this is captured by Frisch parameter that varies with income level.
4.3 Model Database and Parameters
The database for the model is built based on the Social Accounting Matrix 2003 specif-
ically constructed for this research, as described in detail in the earlier section. For the
purpose of the case studies the industry is aggregated into 38 sectors and the commodity
is aggregated into 43 sectors.
There are some sets of parameters of which their values have to be estimated or
borrowed from literature or other models. Those set of parameters are,
1. Armington elasticity between domestic and imported commodities, ARMc .
2. Export elasticity, "EXPc :
3. Elasticity of substitution among labor types (or skills), LABi .
4. Elasticity of substitution among primary factors, PRIMi .
5. CET transformation for industries with multiple commodities, CETi .
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6. Elasticity of substitution among energy types, ENi .
7. Elasticity of substitution between energy composite and primary factor, V Ei .
8. Expenditure elasticity for LES household demand system, "ih, and
9. Frisch parameter, elasticity of marginal utility of income, h.
Parameter 1 to 5, ARMc , "
EXP
c , 
LAB
i , 
PRIM
i , 
CET
i , are taken from GTAP database.
Parameter 6 and 7, ENi and 
V E
i , is borrowed from INDOCEEM model. Parameter
"ih are estimated econometrically, and Frisch parameter h is calculated based on the
study by Lluch et al. (1977).
It can be shown that all parameters of the LES household demand can be written as
function of only expenditure elasticity and Frisch parameter, the elasticity of marginal
utility of income. Hence parameter of the demand system that are supplied to the model
are those two parameters, expenditure elasticity for specic commodity and specic
household, "ih, and Frisch parameter for each households, h.
The best approach to estimate the parameter of the LES is using a demand system
estimation model. However, the household survey data (SUSENAS) does not have data
on most prices and obtaining prices from data on value and volume of consumption is
not possible. The alternative is to estimate the expenditure elasticities by the regression
of the Engel curves. Following Deaton and Case (1988), The Engel curve is specied for
44 broad commodity classication i for urban and rural sample, specied as,
wi = i + i ln (y) + i ln (s) +
X
j
ijRj + ei
where wi is expenditure share of commodity i, y is total expenditure, s is household size,
Rj is regional (provincial) dummy variables, and ei is error term. The engel curves are
estimated using OLS method with robust (Hubber-White) standard error. Expenditure
elasticity for commodity i, "i is calculated as
"i = 1 +
i
wi
Table 3 shows the regression result and the calculated expenditure elasticities using
mean of expenditure share over the samples.
Frisch parameter is calculated based on the widely-known study by Lluch et al.
(1977) that estimated the relationship between Frisch parameter and income per capita.
The conjecture from the study is used to calculate the Frisch parameter for each house-
hold, that is
h =  36  y 0:36
where y is income per capita in 1970 US Dollar.
14
Table 3: Estimation Result of the Engel Curve and Expenditure Elasticity
Urban Rural
Commodity i s.e "i i s.e. "i
Automotive diesel oil 0.00061 0.00007 ** 3.397 0.00074 0.00029 * 5.604
Food (agriculture) -0.00794 0.00021 ** 0.614 -0.01880 0.00060 ** 0.551
Appliances 0.00234 0.00013 ** 1.561 0.00540 0.00020 ** 2.082
Beverages 0.00512 0.00020 ** 1.559 0.00466 0.00024 ** 1.776
Chemical products -0.00849 0.00022 ** 0.799 -0.00517 0.00026 ** 0.874
Clothes 0.00118 0.00010 ** 1.123 0.00282 0.00013 ** 1.291
Coee and tea -0.00460 0.00008 ** 0.497 -0.00469 0.00013 ** 0.647
Communication equipment 0.00424 0.00026 ** 1.989 0.00725 0.00040 ** 3.426
Communication services 0.02341 0.00037 ** 2.866 0.00330 0.00019 ** 4.771
Dairy products 0.00875 0.00035 ** 1.565 0.00933 0.00029 ** 2.427
Drugs/medicines 0.00002 0.00012 1.004 -0.00015 0.00014 0.964
Edible oil -0.00930 0.00012 ** 0.475 -0.01108 0.00017 ** 0.556
Education 0.01258 0.00055 ** 1.575 0.00346 0.00031 ** 1.453
Electricity 0.00083 0.00021 ** 1.033 0.00126 0.00020 ** 1.079
Fish -0.01234 0.00038 ** 0.754 -0.00277 0.00058 ** 0.958
Flours/bread 0.00235 0.00015 ** 1.242 0.00155 0.00022 ** 1.166
Fruits 0.00612 0.00029 ** 1.220 0.01019 0.00039 ** 1.374
Furniture 0.00186 0.00011 ** 1.810 0.00414 0.00019 ** 2.787
Gasoline 0.01456 0.00031 ** 2.270 0.01130 0.00028 ** 3.063
Water and gas 0.00166 0.00012 ** 1.275 0.00063 0.00006 ** 1.674
Health 0.00731 0.00074 ** 1.488 0.00985 0.00077 ** 1.758
Hotel and restaurant 0.00753 0.00054 ** 1.188 0.01268 0.00065 ** 1.607
Jewelry 0.00218 0.00016 ** 1.767 0.00563 0.00029 ** 2.953
Kerosene -0.01530 0.00020 ** 0.228 -0.00302 0.00021 ** 0.840
Livestock -0.00331 0.00023 ** 0.888 0.01122 0.00037 ** 1.418
LPG 0.00424 0.00009 ** 2.166 0.00182 0.00008 ** 3.432
Meat 0.00894 0.00028 ** 1.475 0.01483 0.00035 ** 2.228
Noodles -0.00112 0.00014 ** 0.890 0.00329 0.00017 ** 1.382
Other durable -0.00397 0.00029 ** 0.607 -0.01973 0.00052 ** 0.358
Other fuels 0.00348 0.00009 ** 2.177 0.00424 0.00020 ** 3.175
Other transportation 0.00488 0.00058 ** 1.238 0.00893 0.00075 ** 2.072
Food (manufacturing) -0.01072 0.00062 ** 0.890 0.00368 0.00066 ** 1.050
Other services 0.04807 0.00153 ** 1.352 0.00459 0.00086 ** 1.061
Paper/print products 0.00541 0.00017 ** 1.623 0.00281 0.00024 ** 1.500
Plastic, ceramics, etc 0.00092 0.00008 ** 1.311 0.00232 0.00012 ** 1.645
Recreation 0.00107 0.00008 ** 2.162 0.00094 0.00007 ** 2.643
Rice -0.08405 0.00074 ** 0.191 -0.12345 0.00101 ** 0.358
Road transportation 0.00116 0.00016 ** 1.134 0.00269 0.00014 ** 1.774
Sugar -0.00913 0.00012 ** 0.423 -0.01000 0.00020 ** 0.611
Textiles -0.00001 0.00024 1.000 0.00450 0.00032 ** 1.137
Tobacco products -0.00813 0.00068 ** 0.867 0.02490 0.00101 ** 1.315
Vegetables -0.02382 0.00029 ** 0.498 -0.02076 0.00040 ** 0.678
Vehicles 0.02141 0.00103 ** 3.576 0.03471 0.00158 ** 6.171
Note: **) signicant at 1%, *) signicant at 5%. Source: SUSENAS 2002 Consumption Module
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4.4 Method for Analyzing Distributional Impact
In a general equilibrium framework, the distributional impact of any exogenous shocks
to the model (e.g., policy or external shocks) works through the market mechanism.
Optimizing rms will change their demand for factor inputs, intermediate inputs, and
their supply of commodities. Change in a rm's demand for factors will aect factor
prices, i.e., wages and non-labour income in the factor market, and at the end aect
household's incomes and its distribution across households. Change in the income of ev-
ery household depends on the composition of factor ownership (unskilled labour, skilled
labour, capital, or land) of the household.
Change in household income together with change in all commodity prices, will
simultaneously change household expenditures on various commodities. This will aect
distribution of income and expenditure. In a general equilibrium framework, this series
of mechanisms, works simultaneously in inter-related markets. Therefore, any attempt
to assess the distributional impact of policies, by identifying either their impact on
household expenditure "or" household income will be considered incomplete, because it
is a one-sided story. Both sides are endogenous, and a CGE model elegantly takes these
two dierent forces into account.
Figure 4 illustrate how, for example, subsidy cut on fuels aect distribution across
households. Government may aect commodity prices through indirect taxes and sub-
sidies. Subsidy cut on fuels will increase price of fuels sold in the commodity market.
Household's demand for fuels will fall. Household's demand for other commodities may
change as well because in a demand system, commodities are inter-related. Household's
total expenditure will change, and this will aect their welfare. How much each house-
hold's expenditure change depends on their consumption pattern, which vary across
households. However, this is not the end of the story.
Since fuels are also used by industries as intermediate, the rise in their prices will
aect industry's optimal decision on the production process. Transportation sectors, for
example, will be heavily aected, and most probably will contract, as well as some other
industries. Industry's decision on production will aect their demand for various factors
of production such as skilled labor, unskilled labor, and capital. This will in turn will
change their prices such as wages in the factor market. Since factors of production are
supplied by households, households will experience decline in their factor incomes.
How much each of the households experience income falls depend on their composi-
tion of factor ownership, and depend on how much the price of each factors falls/rises.
When household's income falls, again this will aect household demand for commodities,
and household's expenditures. When new equilibrium is found, the end results is the
new distribution of household's welfare which could be measured by the new distribution
of their (real) expenditure.
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There are a few approaches for dealing with income distribution analysis in a CGE
model. The traditional one is the representative household method, where it is assumed
income or expenditure of households follows a certain functional form of distribution12.
Distribution is assumed to remain constant before and after the shock, and usually
the behaviour of the group is also dominated by the richest. There has been growing
evidences to suggest variation within the one single household-category is important and
can signicantly aect the results of the analysis (Decaluwe et al. 1999). Household-
specic shocks, such as transfers to targeted household groups, are also impossible to
carry out with approach. Studies by Indonesia by Sugema et al. (2005) and Oktaviani
et al. (2005), among others, belong to this type of approach.
The most common studies for Indonesia are CGE studies that use the ocial house-
hold classication of the SAM, i.e., 10 socioeconomic classes. The distributional impact
is only analyzed by comparing the impact of policies among these socioeconomic classes.
Studies by Clements et al. (2003) Resosudarmo (2003), Azis (2000), and Azis (2006),
among others, follow this approach.
Another approach is a top-down method, where price changes produced by the CGE
model are transferred to a separate micro-simulation model, such as a demand system
model or an income-generation model. Price changes are exogenous in this micro-model,
hence endogeneity of prices is ignored. Studies for Indonesia by Bourguignon et al.
(2003) and Ikhsan et al. (2005) are among this type of approach. Some attempt has
been made to improve this approach by providing feedback from the micro-model to the
CGE model. Belonging to this category among others are studies by Filho and Horridge
(2004) for Brazil, and Savard (2003) for the Philippines.
The most recent approach is multiplying the number of households into as many
as households available in the household level data. Increasing computation capacity
allows a large number of households to be included in the model. It allows the model
to take into account the full detail in the household data, and avoids pre-judgment
about aggregating households into categories. All prices are endogenously determined
by the model, and no prior assumption of parameter distribution is necessary. Dicult
data reconciliation and that the size of the model can become a constraint are among
the drawbacks of this approach. This integrated-microsimulation-CGE model has been
conducted in various studies including Annabi et al. (2005) for Senegal, Plumb (2001)
for U.K., Cororaton and Cockburn (2005) and, Cororaton and Cockburn (2006) for the
Philippines.
The last approach, to be used in this paper, is disaggregating or increasing the
number of household categories by the size of expenditure or income per capita. If
the categories is detailed enough, such as centiles, the distributional impact such as
poverty incidences or standard inequality indicators can be estimated more precisely.
For example, Warr (2006) used this approach for Laos in assessing the poverty impact
of large scale irrigation investment.
The ideal approach in distributional analysis where disaggregated households are
integrated in the CGE model is when all observations in the household survey are
integrated in the model like in the Micro-simulation CGE models. If using only 100
representative household classied by centile for expenditure per capita, how accurate is
the distributional story? As gure 5 illustrates the accuracy in term of poverty incidence
and inequality calculation could be fairly accurate. The line represents the almost
continuous data point of urban households of 29,278 observations using SUSENAS 2003
12Of which the most popular one is log-normal distribution.
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Figure 5: The accuracy of distributional analysis using 100 centiles
consumption module. This line can be used to calculate poverty incidence when we
have the relevant poverty line. The gray circle points represent the data points where
observations are collapsed or aggregated into 100 households by centiles of expenditure
per capita. Calculating poverty incidences using only these 100 data points seems to be
fairly accurate. Moreover, the calculation of Gini coecient using all 29,278 observations
and using only 100 observations produce almost identical results.
Poverty incidence is simply calculated by nding a point in the vertical axis in gure
5, where the expenditure curve cross the vertical line representing poverty line. Since
using only 100 centiles, only discrete number of poverty incidence can be found, the
exact poverty incidence is linearly approximated to nd the decimal point.
Let yc is real expenditure per capita of household of the c-th centile where c =
1; : : : ; n, and n = 100. Poverty incidence then is calculated using
P (yc; yP ) = max fcjyc < yP g+ yP  max fycjyc < yP g
min fycjyc > yP g  max fycjyc < yP g
where yP is the poverty line. The rst term is simply the centile of of which expenditure
per capita is the closest from the origin (the left) to the poverty line. The second term
is the linear approximation of the decimal point of the poverty incidence. This formula
is illustrated in gure 6.
The change in poverty incidence after a policy shock (simulation) is calculated as
P = P
 
y0c; yP
  P (yc; yP )
where
y0c =

1 +
y^c
100

 yc
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Max {c | yc < yp }
Min {yc | yc > yp }
Max {yc | yc < yp }
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c
P = 10 + [a/(a + b)]
Figure 6: Calculating Poverty Incidence
where y^c is the percentage change in real per capita expenditure of household of the
centile c produced from the simulation of the CGE model.
Gini coecient is calculated as
G (yc) =
1
n

n+ 1  2
Pn
c=1 (n+ 1  c) ycPn
c=1 yc

4.5 Scenario, closure and simulation strategy
4.5.1 Scenarios and simulation strategy
Table 4 summarises the scenarios to be simulated. All of the scenarios are related to
the October 2005 package of fuel price reform i.e., increasing the price of gasoline by
87.5%, diesel by 104.7%, and kerosene by 185.7%. The initial database (which represent
the equilibrium in the economy), is modied to mimic the fuel price system of the year
2005 before the implementation of the reform, in the sense that the rate of fuel subsidy
represent the situation in 2005 where the market (or international) price of fuel products
is relatively high due to rapid increase in the crude oil price.
There are two ways of conducting the simulation; rst is by reducing subsidy rate
and let the price determined endogenously by the model. However, it does not exactly
mimic the implementation in the reality since fuel prices is administered or determined
in Indonesia, and once it is announced it will stay the same until another adjustment.
In this sense, fuel prices can be regarded as exogenous. It is also hard to determine how
much the subsidy rate should be reduced to represent the October 2005 package. The
second approach then is used, i.e., the price of fuels are set exogenously and subsidy
rate is set to be determined endogenously in the model. In this way the simulation can
represent exactly the rate of price increase as exactly announced by the government on
the rst of October 2005.
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Table 4: Simulation Scenarios
Scenario Note
SIM 1. NO-KER October 2005 Package without increasing kerosene price
(Gasoline 87.5%, Diesel 104.7%)
SIM 2. ALL FUELS October 2005 Package
(Gasoline 87.5%, Diesel 104.7%, Kerosene 185.7%)
SIM 3. 100% UT October 2005 Package with unconditional cash transfers
to targeted household of Rp. 1.2 million
with 100% eectiveness.
SIM 4. 75% UT October 2005 Package with unconditional cash transfers
to targeted household of Rp. 1.2 million
with 75% eectiveness.
SIM 5. 100% UTUR October 2005 Package with unconditional cash transfers
to targeted household with higher amount to urban
household and lower amount to rural household
(100% eectiveness)
SIM 6. CT ONLY Conditional transfers to be spent on education and health
SIM 7. CT October 2005 Package with conditional transfers
to be spent on education and health
The objective of Simulation 1 (SIM 1 NO-KEROSENE) is to see the economy wide
impact and more importantly the distributional direction of October 2005 package had
the kerosene price increase not included. Many Indonesian economists believed that
fuel price subsidy in itself benet mostly the riches, hence, its removal or its reduction
will hurt the riches more relative to the poor. Therefore a reform will be considered
progressive. However, it will be argued that in Indonesia, kerosene, is part of important
consumption of the poor especially in urban area. It will be compared and shown that
the expectation of progressive nature of fuel price reform will more likely to be the case
if the reform reduced the subsidy of only gasoline and diesel which are very likely to be
important part of the riches' expenditure and did not touch kerosene. The simulation
is intended only to see the direction of subsidy reduction (or ceteris paribus), hence will
exclude compensation.
In simulation 2 (SIM 2 ALL FUELS), October 2005 reform package in the form
of increasing fuel prices is implemented without compensation scheme. It is again to
see how its distributional impact would have been likely if the big reform like this was
implemented without compensation.
Simulation 3 (SIM 3 100% UT) is exactly what was implemented by the Government
i.e., increasing price of gasoline by 87.5%, diesel by 104.7% and kerosene by 185.7% plus
unconditional cash transfers to targeted households. Being unconditional means that
the transfers is lump-sum and recipients households have any discretion on how it can
be spent.
To whom was the compensation be targeted? In the initial database, poverty in-
cidence is calculated based on the ocial SUSENAS-based poverty incidence in 2005.
The approach is to nd poverty line in urban and rural area that will give exact number
of ocial poverty incidence. The poverty incidence in urban area is 11.37%, 19.51%
in rural area, and 19.65% nation-wide. However, it turned out that the target of the
compensation is not only those below ocial poverty line, but also those who are called
the near poor.
Initially, the program was targeted to 15.5 million poor and near-poor households
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(around 28 percent of the national population and in excess of the poverty rate of 16
percent) (ESMAP 2006). However, later on, the recipients list was blown up to 19.2
million households (BPS 2006). The recipients then are well beyond the poor as dened
by SUSENAS poverty line. The number of recipients households (and population) is
calculated and equivalent to, in proportion, almost twice poverty incidences in urban
and rural area. Therefore, in the simulation, the cash transfers will be given to the
lowest 24% of the population in urban area, and the lowest 42% in rural area. With this
estimate, the total amount of transfers is Rp. 18.3 trillion rupiahs (in 2003 price level,
since the model database is using SAM 2003)13. World Bank (2006) even considered
this scheme as the world's largest ever cash transfer program. The actual size of the
transfer was Rp 300,000 per household and disbursed every three months, totalling
Rp 1.2 million in one year. For the purpose of the simulation, the nominal transfers is
deated to the year 2003.
In simulation 3, it is assumed that the compensation scheme is 100% eective. This
is clearly too idealistic. There are many possible sources of the ineectiveness of the
compensation. The ex-ante targeting may be imperfect, in the sense, that the entitled
households were not among the target, and the households who are not entitled, on the
other hand, were among the target. This source of ineectiveness was mainly due to
statistical error of recording. Another source of ineectiveness is the possibility that
the compensation did not reach the targeted households (although already disbursed)
or not fully reach the target. This may happen due to ineective administration or
bureaucracy in the process of disbursement, as well as corruption.
There is not yet any consensus, however, on the degree of eectiveness of the compen-
sation scheme. One study by SMERU (2006), however may give an indication. SMERU
(2006) compared the number of recipient households with the number of poor house-
holds across regions and examined its correlation. This could be done, because SMERU
(2006) uses the poverty mapping that enable observation in geographical detail. The
exercise suggest a coecient correlation of 0.65 to 0.72. Based on this result, another
simulation, i.e. simulation 4 (SIM 4. 75% UT) is conducted by assuming that the eec-
tiveness of compensation is 75 percent. In this simulation, the amount of cash that is
given to every centile group of households is reduced by 25%. This can be interpreted
as mis-targetting of households within each centile group or it may also be interpreted
as the amount of cash received by the targeted households die out by 25%. In practice,
both cases could happen.
Another issue that seems missing in the public discussion with regard to the ef-
fectiveness of compensation scheme is the simplistic way of giving the same amount of
money to all household across Indonesia. Indonesia is a large country, and its geographic
nature (such as being an archipelago of thousand of islands) is among the reason why
price level, for example, vary across regions. Even if, the setting and planning for var-
ious dierent amount of transfer geographically seems not to be a simple task, at least
distinction between urban and rural household might have made more sense. Simply
using information from the most recent household survey, It is not dicult to see that
urban households will be hurt more by the jump in kerosene price, compared to rural
households, simply because poor household consume a lot less of kerosene. Therefore,
giving the larger amount of money to urban poor households and less money to rural
poor households could have been regarded as a sensible option. Among the possible
13With 19.2 million households as beneciaries the actual amount in 2005 price level will be around
Rp 23 trilion rupiahs.
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reason, the government did not consider this option that they were condent that even
with 1.2 million rupiah a household, urban poor will be compensated, and if it over-
compensate rural poor, it was still under their budget anyway Simulation 5 (SIM 5
100% UTUR), then, attempt to simulate slight modication in the scheme by giving
dierent amount of transfer to urban and rural household, since might help preventing
even urban households poor fell into poverty.
In this simulation, urban household receive higher amount of transfers than rural
households, such that the total budget allocated for the scheme more or less the same.
The amount of money transferred to urban household is increased by 35 percent, while
to rural household is reduced by 15 percent. This simulation assume 100 percent eec-
tiveness, so comparable to SIM 3.
The way that the compensation scheme is an unconditional lump-sum cash transfers
invited quite many criticism. Giving a lump-sum amount of cash to poor households with
total discretion of them in spending them can be seen by some people to be a less wise
means of helping the poor compared to giving them education, for example. However,
those critics may miss the point that the nature of this transfer is a compensation.
The idea is mitigating the adverse distributional eect of scal and eciency-motivated
reform. However, with regard to this idea, it seems that the government take this
idea into consideration, and indicate of introducing a conditional cash transfers in the
near future. Conditional cash transfers is a transfers to household with the condition
that the recipients will spend it into specic type of spending, such as those related
to human capital investment (health and education spending). Had the compensation
scheme built in the energy price reform is conditional, how would its distributional
impact have been? To explore this issue, rst simulation Simulation 6 (SIM 6 CT
ONLY), introduce a conditional cash transfers (conditional on spending into health and
education) to targeted household, unrelated to energy price reform, with the purpose of
seeing the distributional direction of this sort of transfer. And nally, this conditional
cash transfer is combined and built in to the fuel price reform of October 2005 package
in Simulation 7 (SIM 7 CT).
Simulating the conditional transfers is carried out by giving price subsidy to targeted
household for the targeted commodities. For comparison purposes, the subsidy rate is
simulated for the targeted households is increased such (in similar proportion between
education and health) such that the budget allocated is equivalent to the unconditional
cash transfers.
4.5.2 Closures
All of the 7 simulations above will be carried out under two dierent closures i.e., short-
run and long-run closure. Short run is dened as a length of run such that capital
is not mobile across sectors or sector-specic. Whenever demand for capital for each
sector rises/falls, its price will adjust accordingly. In this closure, price of capital is not
equalised across sector.
The long-run closure is more neoclassical in nature, that is capital is freely mobile
across industry and its price is equalised nation-wide. On the other hand labor for
each type (or skills) are freely mobile, but segmented between skills. Skill-specic wage
is equalised nation-wide in both long-run and short-run closure. Another alternative
closure, which is not used in the simulation is Keynesian closure, where wage rigidity
may allow unemployment. Overall, the factor market closure represent neoclassical
model, with xed supply and fully-employed. The xity of the primary factors supply
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constrains aggregated GDP at the supply side.
At the aggregate demand side, aggregate real investment and aggregate real govern-
ment consumption are exogenous, whereas aggregate real consumption is endogenous
hence can be interpreted as aggregate index of welfare. Trade balance is also endogenous.
At the government account, the exogenous aggregate real government consumption is
counter-balanced by endogenous government saving (nominal government revenue minus
nominal government expenditure). Consumer's price index is set as the numeraire.
4.6 Result and discussion
4.6.1 Macroeconomic and industry results
Table 5 and table 6 shows selected macroeconomic impact as well as industry output
result under short-run and long-run closure, respectively. The impacts of all simulations
on real GDP is relatively small, under both closures. This merely reects the xity
of primary factors supply and full employment assumed in the standard neoclassical
model. The impact on GDP might have been larger under Keynesian closure when
full employment assumption is relaxed, for example, by imposing wage rigidity in labor
market.
Aggregate real household consumption can be interpreted as an index of aggregate
welfare. It is also the summation of all household's real consumption in the economy. In
general, increasing fuel prices reduced real household's expenditure both in the short-run
and long-run. In simulation 4 for example, where October 2005 package plus compen-
sation with 75% eectiveness, aggregate real consumption fall by 5.17% (compared to
base line). Although compensation is given only to poor (and near poor) households, it
also tend to mitigate the adverse impact on aggregate welfare. Comparing simulation 2
(fuel prices rise without compensation), and simulation 3 (increasing fuel price plus com-
pensation, 100% eective), for example, have muted the negative impact on aggregate
real expenditure by around 1.2% (6.01% compared with 4.89%). In the long-run the
impact on aggregate real expenditure is slightly lower. This could be possible, because
capital mobility may moderate the impact on return to capital, through adjustment in
the factor market. This will help households with more endowment of capital.
The percentage change in output across industries represent, resource allocation
eect from the shocks. Increasing price of petroleum products lower the demands for
fuels, and its immediate industry impact is the reduction in the output of renery
industry. The nal (new equilibrium) reduction in the output of petroleum renery
is around 2.8 percent in simulation 2 (without compensation). Other industries which
experience rather big contractions are those which closely related to petroleum products.
They are road transportation ( 2.9%), other transportation ( 4.7%), and utility sectors
(electricity by  2.2%, and water and gas by  4.13%). Fall in output occurs, in some
services sectors, and to lesser extent in agriculture (paddy and other food crops). Due
to resource allocation, which in the short-run mostly from labor mobility, some others
sectors expands. In simulating fuel subsidy reduction, Clements et al. (2003), also
reports utilities, as well as agricultural, and services fall.
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Table 5: Simulated Macroeconomic and Industry Results, Short Run Closure
SIMULATION
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Macroeconomic
Gross Domestic Product (nominal) -0.16 -1.01 -1.11 -1.08 -1.10 0.22 -0.81
Gross Domestic Product (real) -0.35 -0.45 -0.42 -0.43 -0.42 -0.48 -0.77
Real household expenditure -3.32 -6.01 -4.89 -5.17 -4.88 1.79 -4.69
Export (nominal) 3.68 6.15 3.73 4.33 3.73 -4.12 3.20
Real export 3.23 7.25 5.50 5.94 5.48 -3.71 4.41
Import (nominal) -2.97 -5.93 -6.03 -6.01 -6.02 1.33 -4.99
Real import -3.96 -6.22 -5.39 -5.60 -5.39 2.53 -4.66
Change in trade/GDP ratio 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.02
Industry output
Paddy -0.14 -0.59 -0.10 -0.21 -0.14 0.13 -0.34
Other food crops -0.40 -0.90 -0.62 -0.69 -0.63 0.23 -0.72
Estate crops 1.18 2.58 1.73 1.94 1.77 -0.92 1.83
Livestock -0.69 -1.50 -1.15 -1.24 -1.14 0.36 -1.23
Wood and forests 0.73 1.32 1.06 1.12 1.06 -0.44 1.02
Fish -0.34 -0.28 -0.39 -0.37 -0.39 0.01 -0.32
Coal 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.02
Crude oil -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 -0.09
Natural gas -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.12 -0.15
Other mining 0.05 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.15 -0.29 0.01
Rice -0.15 -0.64 -0.11 -0.23 -0.16 0.16 -0.36
Other food (manufactured) -0.32 -0.70 -0.47 -0.53 -0.47 0.06 -0.71
Clothing 1.27 2.07 1.84 1.90 1.83 -0.79 1.54
Wood products 1.47 2.54 2.02 2.15 2.03 -0.67 2.09
Pulp and paper 0.41 1.21 0.87 0.96 0.87 -0.61 0.81
Chemical product 0.23 1.17 0.89 0.96 0.88 -1.71 -0.05
Petroleum renery -2.02 -2.48 -2.49 -2.49 -2.49 -0.18 -2.62
LNG -0.44 -0.35 -0.39 -0.38 -0.39 -0.32 -0.59
Rubber and products 0.97 2.66 1.87 2.07 1.88 -1.88 1.31
Plastic and products 0.42 0.84 0.69 0.73 0.68 -0.66 0.37
Non-ferous metal 0.08 0.39 0.33 0.34 0.32 -0.22 0.26
Other metal 0.05 0.51 0.36 0.40 0.35 -0.61 0.09
Machineries 2.02 4.24 3.44 3.64 3.40 -3.61 1.57
Automotive industries -0.65 -0.87 -0.92 -0.91 -0.92 0.23 -0.75
Other manufacturing 0.84 1.53 1.41 1.44 1.39 -0.84 0.95
Electricity -1.35 -2.20 -1.75 -1.87 -1.73 0.24 -2.00
Water and gas -2.67 -4.13 -3.83 -3.90 -3.76 0.57 -3.69
Construction -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 0.16 0.05
Trade 0.51 0.94 0.85 0.87 0.84 -0.80 0.35
Hotel and restaurants -0.67 -1.62 -1.26 -1.35 -1.23 0.41 -1.29
Road transportation -2.38 -2.98 -2.77 -2.82 -2.75 0.10 -2.88
Other transportation -4.22 -4.67 -4.58 -4.61 -4.57 -0.40 -4.86
Banking and nance 0.30 0.42 0.34 0.36 0.35 -1.18 -0.47
General government 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.11 -0.02
Education -1.16 -2.22 -1.75 -1.87 -1.70 9.47 5.40
Health -1.39 -2.87 -2.15 -2.33 -2.16 13.14 7.32
Entertainment 1.23 1.86 1.52 1.61 1.51 -3.22 -0.64
Other services -0.64 -1.18 -1.11 -1.13 -1.10 -0.30 -1.43
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Table 6: Simulated Macroeconomic and Industry Results, Long Run Closure
SIMULATION
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Macroeconomic
Gross Domestic Product (nominal) 0.11 -0.76 -0.79 -0.78 -0.78 0.04 -0.64
Gross Domestic Product (real) 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.52 -0.33
Real household expenditure -2.80 -5.51 -4.29 -4.59 -4.28 1.53 -4.28
Export (nominal) 4.07 6.63 4.22 4.82 4.22 -3.51 4.09
Real export 4.32 9.14 7.08 7.59 7.07 -3.91 6.07
Import (nominal) -2.40 -5.47 -5.39 -5.41 -5.38 1.41 -4.36
Real import -2.61 -4.37 -3.62 -3.81 -3.62 1.65 -3.25
Change in trade/GDP ratio 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.02
Industry output
Paddy -0.16 -0.78 -0.14 -0.29 -0.19 0.26 -0.44
Other food crops -0.48 -1.42 -0.83 -0.98 -0.85 0.37 -1.07
Estate crops 1.17 2.85 1.82 2.08 1.86 -0.89 2.06
Livestock -0.75 -2.01 -1.35 -1.52 -1.36 0.49 -1.58
Wood and forests 1.82 3.07 2.53 2.66 2.53 -0.74 2.55
Fish -0.37 -0.47 -0.48 -0.48 -0.48 0.03 -0.46
Coal 3.16 3.13 3.42 3.35 3.44 -0.20 3.07
Crude oil 15.63 22.06 20.08 20.57 20.01 -6.05 17.15
Natural gas 9.93 18.99 15.89 16.66 15.79 -6.58 12.08
Other mining 0.81 1.51 1.30 1.35 1.29 -0.76 1.02
Rice -0.16 -0.82 -0.14 -0.30 -0.20 0.29 -0.46
Other food (manufactured) -0.60 -1.67 -1.03 -1.19 -1.04 0.34 -1.37
Clothing 2.44 3.96 3.55 3.66 3.54 -1.18 3.15
Wood products 3.73 6.09 4.93 5.22 4.94 -1.38 5.08
Pulp and paper -0.13 0.73 0.31 0.41 0.33 0.55 1.21
Chemical product -0.96 -0.25 -0.45 -0.40 -0.46 -1.08 -0.94
Petroleum renery -11.21 -14.08 -14.03 -14.05 -14.04 0.06 -14.10
LNG -3.74 -1.81 -2.66 -2.44 -2.68 -2.49 -3.31
Rubber and products 0.37 3.08 1.58 1.96 1.61 -2.17 1.45
Plastic and products 0.34 1.10 0.81 0.89 0.80 -0.93 0.48
Non-ferous metal -0.04 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 -0.15 0.11
Other metal -0.29 0.14 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.44 -0.13
Machineries 1.82 5.30 3.91 4.26 3.88 -4.09 2.33
Automotive industries -2.16 -3.24 -3.15 -3.18 -3.16 1.07 -2.39
Other manufacturing 0.81 1.54 1.67 1.64 1.62 -0.94 0.99
Electricity -1.21 -2.17 -1.62 -1.76 -1.60 0.37 -1.81
Water and gas -2.44 -4.04 -3.61 -3.72 -3.54 0.70 -3.45
Construction -0.07 -0.11 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 0.23 0.07
Trade 0.30 0.18 0.40 0.34 0.40 -0.21 0.09
Hotel and restaurants -0.61 -1.98 -1.34 -1.50 -1.30 0.64 -1.41
Road transportation -2.34 -3.05 -2.74 -2.82 -2.72 0.18 -2.84
Other transportation -4.97 -5.88 -5.57 -5.65 -5.55 0.33 -5.51
Banking and nance -0.01 -0.45 -0.32 -0.35 -0.29 -0.26 -0.57
General government 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.03
Education -1.18 -2.42 -1.84 -1.99 -1.79 11.88 6.56
Health -1.23 -2.82 -2.00 -2.20 -2.01 14.58 8.20
Entertainment 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 -1.06 -0.44
Other services -0.80 -1.89 -1.61 -1.68 -1.58 0.26 -1.65
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In general, the short-run simulation, suggest of resources reallocation (in this case,
mostly labor) from renery and related sectors, to some non-food agriculture sectors,
non-food manufacturing, trade, and some other services. The fall in some food-related
sectors is most likely, second round eect, following the decline in households real in-
comes especially the lowest income classes. It can be indicated, for example, by their
much less contraction, when the shocks exclude kerosene (hence urban poor is less af-
fected), or with compensation (where urban and rural poor's are compensated).
When capital is allowed to move freely across sectors, the renery sectors experience
a lot bigger contractions followed by signicant expansion of crude oil and natural gas
sectors. Since petroleum renery is highly capital-intensive sectors, some capital is
released and re-allocated to other highly capital intensive sectors i.e., resource-based
mining sectors. The increase in the output of crude-oil and gas sectors are mostly sold
to international market as exports, contributing more to additional surplus in the trade
balance.
4.6.2 Distributional results
The biggest advantage of the CGE model with disaggregated households by centile of
expenditure per capita is direct calculation of inequality indicator such as Gini coe-
cient. Therefore, more objective answer to a question of whether or not a policy shock is
progressive or regressive is readily available. When the policy simulation increase Gini
coecient, then the policy can be judged regressive. If it reduces Gini coecient, it
can be regarded as progressive. As shown, in previous section as well, that the model
also allows direct calculation of poverty incidences, in urban area, rural area, and all
Indonesia.
The following discussions will focus on the result on distributional story across the
scenarios, in particular, with regard to inequality and poverty incidences. Table 7 sum-
marises the distributional results of the simulations.
Figure 7 to gure 13 illustrate the impact of each scenarios on household's real
expenditure, income, and household specic consumer's price index (CPI) for urban
and rural households as well as across centiles. In the same gures, Gini coecients
for urban, rural, as well as nation-wide are reported, including their Lorenz curves.
From gure 7 to gure 13, how each scenarios aect real expenditure of each household
groups could be indicated. The percentage change in this real expenditure will be used
to calculate inequality and poverty incidence after each shocks (ex-post). In addition,
how change in household income and household specic CPI may give indication of how
expenditure pattern and factor return pattern of each household may contribute to the
distributional results.
As explained in earlier section, in an economy-wide framework, both force contribute
to the distributional story, and integrated and taken into account simultaneously in the
model. Household specic CPI is essentially a consumption-weighted average of the price
increase of every commodities consumed by the household, hence reects the impact of
household expenditure pattern and behaviour. These price changes reects adjustment
in the market for commodities. On the other hand, household income, reect changes
in all source of household income (i.e., labor by skill types, capital, and land, including
transfers, as compensation), and hence reect the impact of what happens in market
for factors. Poverty impact of each scenarios are illustrated in gure 14 to 20, where
change in poverty incidence both in urban and rural area, as well as nation-wide is also
reported.
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Subsidy on vehicle fuels is regressive, its removal is equitable.
As mentioned previously, long before the implementation of fuel price reform in
October 2005, fuel subsidy had been regarded as both inecient and inequitable. Be-
cause the rich was regarded as the big consumers of fuel, especially vehicle fuels, it
had been a long-held view, that reducing fuel subsidy will hurt the non-poor more,
and such reform would be progressive. Simulation 1 (SIM 1 NO-KEROSENE) to some
extent support that the long-held view. Fuel subsidy on gasoline and diesel had been
inequitable. Therefore, cutting the subsidy on such vehicle fuels is a progressive reform.
In this simulation, October 2005 package without compensation is simulated but only
to non-kerosene commodity.
As can be seen from gure 7, the obvious declining pattern of the fall in real expen-
diture over expenditure centile clearly suggest the progressivity of this sort of reform.
This happens both in urban and rural area. As a result, inequality drops both in urban
and rural area, as well as nation-wide, as indicated by the falling Gini coecient. This
progressivity is driven both from the household consumption pattern (from the pattern
of the change in household CPI) and household income pattern (from the pattern of
the change in household income). Richer households experience far more rise in their
consumer's price, reecting their higher dependence on non-kerosene vehicle fuel con-
sumption, as well as lower fall in their income, reecting the adjustment in factor market
which is not in favor of the higher income class' factor endowment14.
Despite its progressivity, however, it should be noted that without compensation,
such reform would still have adverse poverty impact. Figure 14 shows that nation-wide
poverty rises by 1.28 percent.
Including kerosene, however, is regressive, especially in urban area.
However, the actual real reform package implemented in October 2005, not only
touched kerosene commodity, of which urban poor is its bigger consumers, but also in-
crease the price of kerosene even higher than the increase in other fuel prices. Kerosene
administered price was drastically increased almost tripled (185.7 percent), a lot higher
compared to the increase other fuel prices (87.5 percent for gasoline, and 104.7 per-
cent for diesel). Being implemented in this way, will this package of reform still be
progressive?
To nd out the impact of this package might have been on distribution, the increase
in the administered prices of fuel without compensation is simulated in SIM 2 (ALL
FUELS). It turns out, that the simulation produce markedly dierent distributional
story compared to the rst simulation. In urban area, the decline in the real expenditure
of the 20 percent poorest households, fall within the magnitude of 7.5 to 9 percent,
whereas the richest 20 percent households experience decline in real expenditure of
between 4 to 5.5. percent only. The pattern of the fall in real expenditure of the urban
households is clearly increasing over centile of expenditure. As a result, Inequality
increase quite signicantly in urban area, as Gini coecient increase from 0.347 to 0.352
(see gure 8).
In rural area, however, the pattern is less clear. Rural real expenditure for all
households falls within the range of around 5 to 7 percent. Overall, the impact is
14Allowing free capital mobility in the long-run closure simulation, slightly reduce the degree of pro-
gressivity and the fall in inequality. Because capital can move to less-contracting or even expanding
sector, household with more endowment of capital can mitigate the adverse fall in their return to capi-
tal.
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Figure 14: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 1 NO-KEROSENE
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Figure 15: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 2 ALL FUELS
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Figure 16: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 3 100% UT
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Figure 17: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 4 75% UT
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Figure 18: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 5 100% UTUR
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Figure 19: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 6 CT ONLY
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Figure 20: Simulated Poverty Impact of SIM 7 CT
slightly progressive, reducing inequality slightly. Over the nation (urban and rural
area combined) October 2005 package of fuel price rise (including kerosene) without
compensation, is slightly regressive, increasing Gini coecient to 0.353. As gure 8
suggests, the main driver of this regressive result is urban lower income household's
dependence on kerosene consumption, as well as increase in other commodities related
to fuels, such as transportations. This is reected in the increase in their household
consumer's price which is far higher than that of higher income households.
It should be noted, that when capital mobility is allowed in the long-run closure (see
table 7, the distributional impact is slightly more regressive than in the short run when
capital is industry specic. In the long-run richer households with more endowment of
capital experience less and less fall in their factor income. This happens because capital
mobility might moderate the decline to capital returns.
Had October '05 Package been without compensation, additional 8.5 million
would have become poor.
The impact of October 2005 package without compensation, might have on poverty
could have been tremendous. As shown in gure 15, poverty incidence in urban area
increase by 3.34 percent from 11.37 to 14.71 percent, whereas in rural area it rises even
more by 4.26 percent from 19.51 percent to 23.77 percent. It is a bit surprising to
see, that the reform creates more poverty in rural area than in urban area, when it
is observed from gure 8, that the decline in real expenditure of the rural poor is a
lot less than that of the urban poor. Figure 15 however, suggests that the steepness
of the distribution of expenditure per capita, especially around the poverty line may
explain this result. Rural household is more vulnerable to poverty for a given fall in real
expenditure per capita. The same percentage fall in real expenditure will create more
40
poverty in rural area compared to urban area. In all, poverty incidence, nation-wide,
rise by 3.84 percent. Using the population in 2005, the package without compensation
might have driven around 8.5 million people into poverty.
The above exercise of what-if scenarios suggest that although the reduction in fuel
subsidy as part of the energy price reform might have unambiguous ground in term of
economic eciency, the way the reform is implemented matter when the concern is its
distributional costs. Reducing fuel subsidy per se, without careful prior examination
on how the reform will have impact on the poorer part of population, may have ad-
verse distributional impact. Something that should be avoided even by the pro-energy
price reformist, because the reform should be carried out with the least cost including
distributional cost in terms of inequality and poverty implication.
Most probably, the above concern was the main reason why the actual fuel price
reform in October 2005 package was combined with a compensation scheme. The choice
was lump-sum cash transfers to targeted households (households considered as poor
and near poor). Targeted households was given a cash transfers of 1.2 million rupiahs
(annual) in 4 installments. The government claimed that the amount of transfers was
more than adequate to compensate the potential fall in the welfare of the poor. Some
studies, such as Ikhsan et al. (2005), backed this claim, as well as later study by
World Bank (2006). Simulation 3 (100% UT) is carried out to see the distributional
impact of this reform that was actually implemented. Simulations assumes 100 percent
eectiveness of the cash transfers in reaching the targeted households.
October '05 Package + Compensation might reduce inequality.
As shown in gure 9, the claim that the cash transfers would, in theory, more than
compensate the adverse welfare impact on the poor is only true for the rural poor. For
the urban poor, although, some of the poorest centile gain positive (nominal) income,
when deated with their specic consumer's price rise, the net real expenditure eect
is still negative. None of the targeted households experience positive welfare gain. The
compensation scheme over-compensate the rural poor but under-compensate the urban
poor. however, in term of inequality, despite the drastic rice in the price of kerosene,
the October 2005 package reduce inequality, especially in rural area, by 0.018 point, and
reduce overall Gini coecient from 0.35 to 0.34. This was mainly driven by signicant
increase of real expenditure of the rural poor, less severe fall in the real expenditure of
the urban poor (due to compensation) than the urban non-poor, and the sharp decline
in the real expenditure of the non-targeted (non-poor) households.
However, even if 100% eective, compensation could not help preventing
poverty from rising in urban area.
Figure 16 illustrates the poverty impact of simulation 3 (100% UT). Due to under-
compensation of the urban poor, October 2005 package (with compensation) could not
prevent urban poverty incidence of rising by 1.36 percentage point, despite the fall in
the poverty incidence in rural area by 1.65 percentage point. However, the overall net
nation-wide impact is a slight decline in national poverty incidence by 0.28 percent. The
decline in the rural poverty incidence by 1.65 percent help prevent the overall rise of
nation-wide poverty incidence, mostly because the rural population is higher than in
urban area.
The poverty impact of the simulation with the long-run closure give more or less
similar results (see table 7). What is slightly dierent is only its impact on inequality,
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since in the long-run richer households with more non-labor endowment experience less
severe negative return to capital, due to more factor mobility. As a result, the impact
of the October 2005 reform is slightly more regressive in the long-run.
Moreover, if compensation is only 75% eective, nation-wide poverty still
rises, including in rural area.
It is easily expected that, with the assumption of 75 percent compensation eec-
tiveness, although still inequality reducing15, poor households experience more adverse
impact. As shown in gure 10, even in rural area, only less than half of the targeted
households are compensated. For more than half of them, compensation does not help
mitigate the negative impact of their declining real expenditure. As a result, in contrast
to the assumption of 100 percent eectiveness where poverty incidence in rural area fall,
here it rises by 0.44 percent.
Poverty incidence in urban area rises even more by 1.81 percent. Overall nation-wide
poverty incidence, now increase by 1.05 percent16. This result does not support the claim
that cash transfers prevent the increase in the number of people fell into poverty. Perfect
targeting (100% eectiveness) is not a plausible assumption, and in this simulation,
with only assuming 25% ineectiveness, the story changes. The result does not even
support the possibility of over-compensation in rural area. In contrast, World Bank
(2006) recent calculation suggests that the combined eect of the fuel price increase
and compensation point to a net positive income gain for the poorest 20 percent of the
population. World Bank (2006) suggests that analysis17 of three alternative scenarios
with regard to the targeting show that the lower deciles were on average more than
compensated for the impact of the fuel price increase by the cash transfer. Even under
assumptions of moderate mis-targeting (e.g. with cash benets randomly distributed
to the bottom 40 percent instead of the targeted bottom 28 percent), the lower deciles
were on average more than compensated for the immediate price impacts.
Compensate more to urban, less to rural. It might help.
In simulation 5 (100% UTUR), the scheme is slightly modied by giving more cash to
urban and less to rural targeted households. The result suggests that this modication
might have prevent quite signicant number of urban household fell into poverty, by still
leaving poverty incidence in rural area intact. In this simulation, poverty incidence in
urban area increase by 0.76 percent, in contrast to 1.4 percent if the amount of money is
uniform across urban and rural. In rural area, poverty incidence still fall by 0.1 percent.
The number of people in urban area that fell into poverty due to the reform might have
been reduced signicantly. Uniform cash transfers produce twice additional new poor
people with the slightly modied compensation, compared to the uniform compensation.
The very purpose of the compensation scheme is mitigating the poverty or distribu-
tional impact of the reform. In nature, it is not a means of structural poverty eradication
program. The objective of the compensation scheme is "compensating" households from
15Shown by overall Gini coecient which still fall by 0.007 point.
16In September, 2006, BPS announce the poverty incidence of March 2006, six months after the
package was implemented. Nation-wide poverty rises by 1.78 percent from February 2005 to March
2006, despite the steady decline in the poverty rate since the crisis.
17Using micro-simulation with SUSENAS data. However in the publication, the methodology is not
clearly explained, the explanation does not distinguishes urban-rural, and mostly based on expenditure
pattern from the household survey data.
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the adverse impact of the reform. Hence even if the uniform compensation scheme may
potentially reduce poverty nation-wide due to the over-compensation in rural area, if it
was at the cost of huge increase in poverty in urban area, the slightly modied compen-
sation scheme may be preferable.
Conditional transfers might not have been eective as compensation.
Price subsidy given to targeted households to be spent on education and health (with
more or less using the same budget as the cash transfers) not as a means of compensating
fuel price reform increase the output of education sectors by 9.5%, and health sector
by 13.1% (under short-run closure, see table 5). Since it is given only to lower income
classes, the simulation is progressive, reducing Gini coecient in urban, rural area, as
well as nation-wide (see gure 12). The subsidy, however, from the point of view of
factor market, expand the service sectors like education and health in favor of higher
income class, due the distribution of factor ownership (such as skilled-labor employed in
these sectors). The percentage change in household's income is higher for higher income
groups both in urban and rural area. However, since the subsidy is given to poorer part
of the population, the decline in their household specic CPI drives the distributional
impact to be more progressive. Poverty falls both in urban and rural area signicantly.
Nation-wide poverty incidence fall by 2.76% (gure 19).
However, when conditional transfers like this is used as a compensation scheme
together with October 2005 package, the story turns out to be rather dierent. As
gure 13 shows, Simulation 7 (CT) suggests that inequality rise in urban area, despite
its decline in rural area and slight fall nation-wide. Since expansion in the education
and health sectors increase demand for more skilled-labor and capital which are more
endowed by higher income classes, it drives regressive results even more from the income
pattern. The pattern on the fall in household income shows increasing trends toward
higher income groups. It is worse in urban area, because of their high dependence on
kerosene consumption, and others fuel-related consumptions, such as transportation.
More importantly, the fall in households purchasing powers (as indicated too by
household's specic CPI) does not help compensate the poor. Both in urban and rural
area, all households, including the poor experience fall in their real expenditure. As a
result, poverty rises in urban and rural area, by 1.43% and 1.70% respectively. Nation-
wide it increases by 1.57%. Conditional transfers may be good as an incentives for human
capital investment, but may not be eective as a means of short-run compensation to
mitigate adverse impact of a fuel price reform. It may be better suited for longer-term
objectives, especially if combined with encouraging its demand to change the expenditure
pattern or demand behaviour toward education, especially to rural households. This is
however a longer-term approach of structural poverty alleviation program, not an ad-hoc
occasional compensation scheme to minimize distributional cost of energy price reforms.
5 Concluding Remarks
From methodological perspective, this research shows that with households disaggre-
gated by centile of expenditure per capita, integrated into a CGE model not only allows
for taking into account simultaneously both income pattern and expenditure pattern as
inseparable driving forces into distributional story in an economy-wide framework, but
also allows for more direct and accurate calculation of inequality indicators and poverty
incidences.
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Implementing the methods for analysis of counter factual scenarios on energy price
reform, of October 2005 package in Indonesia, the results suggests that reducing vehicle
fuels subsidy hurt the higher income classes more and hence constitutes a progressive
reforms. However, in the case of Indonesia, where urban lower income classes constitute
the biggest consumers of domestic fuel like kerosene, a reform like October 2005 pack-
age which increasing price of Kerosene very drastically tends to be regressive, unless
accompanied by a proper and eective compensation scheme. If October 2005 package
had not been mitigated with compensation, additional poverty incidence could be quite
huge.
The result also shows that October 2005 package (with compensation) might reduce
inequality, hence, its net distributional impact is progressive. However, even if the
compensation is 100% eective it could not prevent poverty incidence from rising in
urban area, despite slightly falling poverty incidence nation-wide. Moreover, a moderate
ineectiveness of compensations, might even increase poverty nation wide as well as rural
area. In a general equilibrium framework, rural household's being not that dependent
on kerosene, are not immune to the fuel prices reform, due to its economy-wide impact,
especially from the re-adjustment in the factor market.
A slight modication to the uniform amount of cash compensation, by giving more to
urban households and less to rural households may help in minimising the rise in urban
poverty incidences. With regards, to recent widely-discussed of conditional transfers
targeted to education and health spending as compensations, the simulation suggests
that it might not have been an eective way to be accompanied in an energy price
reforms as a means of compensation. It might be better suited for longer-term objectives
of poverty alleviation programs.
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A Appendixes
A.1 Labour Classication
Table 8: List of (ocial SAM) Labor Classcation
Urban/ Formal/ Skill type
Rural Imputed
1. Urban Formal Agricultural Workers
2. Rural Formal Agricultural Workers
3. Urban Imputed Agricultural Workers
4. Rural Imputed Agricultural Workers
5. Urban Formal Production, Transport Operator, Manual, and Unskilled Workers
6. Rural Formal Production, Transport Operator, Manual, and Unskilled Workers
7. Urban Imputed Production, Transport Operator, Manual, and Unskilled Workers
8. Rural Imputed Production, Transport Operator, Manual, and Unskilled Workers
9. Urban Formal Clerical, Services workers
10. Rural Formal Clerical, Services workers
11. Urban Imputed Clerical, Services workers
12. Rural Imputed Clerical, Services workers
13. Urban Formal Administrative, Managerial, Professional, and Technician Workers
14. Rural Formal Administrative, Managerial, Professional, and Technician Workers
15. Urban Imputed Administrative, Managerial, Professional, and Technician Workers
16. Rural Imputed Administrative, Managerial, Professional, and Technician Workers
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